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Abstract
Since Marshall (1890), it has been widely held in urban
economic theory that cities insure workers against the risk
of unemployment by offering a larger pool of potential jobs.
Using a large administrative panel data set on workers
displaced as a result of plant closures, we examine whether
positive effects from a higher urban job density are offset by
more intense competition between workers. When control-
ling for the sorting of workers between regions, we find
robust evidence that the effect of job competition on
unemployment duration exceeds that of job opportunities
in absolute value. Our results put the idea of urban risk‐
sharing into perspective and provide an explanation for
observed longer unemployment durations in cities.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
One key argument for the existence of cities is that denser labor markets insure workers against the risk of
unemployment by providing a larger pool of potential jobs. As a result, workers living in urban areas should benefit
from shorter job search periods in case of involuntary job loss (Duranton & Puga, 2004). This way of reasoning
stands, however, in stark contrast to the observation that, at least in the United States and in Germany, the average
duration of joblessness rises with the local degree of agglomeration. For the United States, a large literature on
spatial mismatch documents a higher incidence of unemployment in downtown areas than in the less densely
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populated suburbs (see, e.g., Gobillon, Selod, & Zenou, 2007; Kain, 1968; Wasmer & Zenou, 2002).1 For the German
case, the left panel of Figure 1 shows that the number of days displaced workers spend in unemployment after
having lost their job is positively correlated with local population density. Consistently, the empirical literature has
so far found little evidence in favor of an urban insurance effect, that is, the density of the local labor market does
not seem to shorten the time workers spend in unemployment (see, e.g., Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2006).
This contradiction might be explained by the prevalence of fiercer job competition between workers in cities for
available jobs (Détang‐Dessendre & Gaigné, 2009; Raphael, 1998). Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) show for the U.S.
labor market that the chances of unemployed to receive a callback for a job interview decrease with the tightness of the
local labor market. In the right panel of Figure 1, we relate local unemployment rates in Germany
to population density to examine whether the intensity of job competition rises with the degree of agglomeration. The
average unemployment rate increases monotonically over the range of population densities, indicating that labor market
tightness increases with local density. As such, the evidence from Figure 1 suggests that the “thickness” of urban labor
markets may turn against workers by reducing individual chances of re‐employment due to more intense job competition.
In this paper, we disentangle the effect that job opportunities and job competition have on the number of days
that workers spend in involuntary unemployment. Since the number of available jobs and the intensity of
competition between workers both rise with the local degree of agglomeration, gaining insight into their relative
importance for the re‐employment prospects of workers provides an important step toward a better understanding
of the extent to which urban labor markets insure workers against the risk of unemployment. Identifying the
effects of job opportunities and job competition on individual employment chances is, however, complicated by the
sorting of workers and firms between locations.
To address this issue, we exploit exogenous events of involuntary unemployment from plant closures, which we
identify based on detailed information from the German social security records. From this data, we extract the
employment biographies of all workers who became unemployed as a result of plant closures between 1999 and 2009.
To further reduce the problem of worker selection and unobserved heterogeneity, we impose sample restrictions with
regard to tenure and changes in places of residence and make use of the panel structure of the data by employing
individual and region fixed effects. The frequency of the data in quarters allows for a detailed analysis of the effect that
F IGURE 1 Unemployment and regional agglomeration. The left panel relates the average duration of
unemployment (based on all noninterrupted episodes of unemployment) to population density (number of
inhabitants per square kilometer). The right panel shows the average unemployment rate by population density.
Both figures are based on pooled data, which cover the years 1999–2014 and are taken from the Statistics of the
Federal Employment Agency and the Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies
1Given the large volume of studies, we refer the reader to the surveys by Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) and Gobillon, Magnac, and Selod (2011).
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job opportunities and job competition have on the re‐employment process of displaced workers. Drawing on
municipalities as the most disaggregated administrative level, we exploit the substantial variation in both variables to
construct market potential‐based indicators, which explicitly take into account spillovers between regions.
In line with the previous literature, we find evidence for a persistent increase in the individual incidence of
unemployment over a period of 4 years after displacement (see, e.g., Couch & Placzek, 2010; Jacobson, LaLonde, &
Sullivan, 1993; Ruhm, 1991; Schmieder, von Wachter, & Bender, 2010). Regarding the effect of job opportunities,
we show that the time spent in unemployment falls significantly with the local density of jobs. This effect is,
however, more than offset by the competition between workers for these jobs. When controlling for individual and
regional heterogeneity and the sorting of workers across locations, we find the effect of job competition to exceed
that of job opportunities by a factor of more than three. Since opportunities and competition both rise with the
degree of agglomeration, job seekers are effectively worse off in “thick labor markets” because competition effects
dominate the opportunity value of cities. These negative effects are largest for workers who are least likely to
resort to self‐employment or to leave the labor market altogether.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the existing literature. Section 3 outlines our
identification strategy. In Section 4, we describe the data and provide first descriptive evidence. The results are
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 | RELATED LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION
The idea that a larger number of potential jobs in cities insures workers against the risk of unemployment goes back
to Marshall (1890). Formalized by Duranton and Puga (2004), the underlying mechanism of this type of risk‐sharing
is that the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks rises with the degree of agglomeration. Workers who
become unemployed are therefore better off in larger cities because of a higher probability that other firms expand
their production after having experienced a positive productivity shock and, hence, are in search of workers to
hire.2 Such positive effects from agglomeration on the labor demand side may, however, be offset by a larger
number of rivaling job seekers who lost their jobs in cities.3 Consistent with this theoretical ambiguity, the empirical
literature on the effect of labor market size on unemployment, which is surveyed in Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001), reveals mainly constant returns to agglomeration, indicating that workers are not better off in larger labor
markets in terms of the duration of their job search. One exception is DiAddario (2011), who finds that the local
degree of agglomeration raises the hazard rate of unemployed workers in Italy.4
The only two papers which explicitly address the competing roles of labor supply and labor demand within local
labor markets are the ones by Détang‐Dessendre and Gaigné (2009) and Andersson, Haltiwanger, Kutzbach,
Pollakowski, and Weinberg (2018).5 Both estimate hazard models with a measure of regional job accessibility as the
independent variable, where the number of available jobs is discounted by geographical distance or travel time as
2On the labor demand side, firms should therefore benefit from lower vacancy times in cities as a result of better access to suitable workers (Moretti,
2011; Rosenthal & Strange, 2001). In line with this notion, Martín‐Barroso, Núñez‐Serrano, and Velázquez (2015, 2017) and Holl (2012) show that firms in
cities are more productive due to better access to factor markets.
3Although differing in the underlying mechanisms, the literature on neighborhood effects of unemployment is closely related to this paper (Bayer, Ross, &
Topa, 2008; Hawranek & Schanne, 2014; Jahn & Neugart, 2017). The general idea is that higher local levels of unemployment impede access to local job‐
referrals networks for unemployed workers. The general finding in this literature is that living in a neighborhood with high unemployment rates raises the
duration of job search for displaced workers.
4Although not directly focusing on unemployment duration, Bleakley and Lin (2012) also provide support for positive scale effects by showing that
unemployed workers in densely populated areas are more likely to be re‐employed in the same occupation.
5Somewhat more distantly related to our paper is the contribution by Neffke, Otto, and Hidalgo (2018), which examines the effect of local industrial
structure on employment probabilities of laid‐off workers. The authors find that employment chances rise with the size of a worker’s old industry and
decline with the presence of different but skill‐related industries. As with Détang‐Dessendre and Gaigné (2009) and Andersson et al. (2018), one
shortcoming of their paper is that the authors do not control for unobserved heterogeneity between workers.
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well as the number of competing job seekers. Both papers find evidence that a rise in job accessibility reduces the
number of days workers spend in unemployment. Interpreted in light of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, their
results suggest that unemployment tends to be higher in urban areas because of a smaller number of accessible
jobs in cities relative to the number of job seekers competing for them.
In the present paper, we extend their analyses in two major respects. First, we disentangle the relative
importance of job opportunities and job competition for a successful recovery out of unemployment. To do so,
we decompose the combined measures of job accessibility used in Détang‐Dessendre and Gaigné (2009) and
Andersson et al. (2018) into the distance‐discounted number of jobs and of competing job seekers to estimate
the effect that changes in either variable have on the time workers spend in unemployment after an
involuntary job loss. As such, the results from this analysis further our understanding of the role that each of
the two sides of the labor market plays for the re‐employment chances of unemployed workers, which is in turn
of key importance for a proper design of labor market policies. Second, our setting allows us to control more
rigorously for worker sorting and unobservable heterogeneity than it was possible in the two earlier papers.
More precisely, the focus on one single unemployment spell per worker has inhibited the use of individual fixed
effects in Détang‐Dessendre and Gaigné (2009) and Andersson et al. (2018). This is problematic if unobserved
worker characteristics are correlated with local labor market conditions (Glaeser, 1996). We address this issue
in two different ways. As in Andersson et al. (2018), we restrict the data to cases of involuntary unemployment
by drawing on incidences of firm closures. In addition, we control for worker sorting and unobserved
heterogeneity by means of individual and regional fixed effects as well as through a number of different sample
restrictions, in particular with regard to tenure and worker mobility.
3 | MEASUREMENT AND IDENTIFICATION APPROACH
3.1 | Measuring opportunities and competition
Any attempt to determine the size and the sources of agglomeration economies requires a suitable definition of a
“region.” In Germany, the smallest administrative units are municipalities. They constitute the fourth administrative
layer and, as such, are similar to cities, towns and villages in the United States. By the end of 2014, 11,194 of these
municipalities existed with an average population of slightly >7,000 inhabitants. Out of these, 15 cities contained
>500,000 residents and another 62 more than 100,000. According to a classification provided by the Federal
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs, and Spatial Development, 848 municipalities can be considered as
urban while the rest is of rural nature.6 While these numbers provide a first glance on the number and the size of
big cities in Germany, in the present context they are deficient in three respects. First, they only provide a binary
classification of a distribution which by its nature is continuous. Second, they do not take into account the extent to
which a local population is sprawled within a region.7 This is of particular relevance when taking into account the
substantial variation in the size of municipalities, which cover a range between less than one (Neuheilenbach) and
890 (Berlin) square kilometers. In addition, Glaeser and Resseger (2010) among others argue that the density of
workers is at least as important for agglomeration economies to materialize as the total number of inhabitants or
workers. Third, focusing on single municipalities ignores potential labor market interactions between them
(Combes & Gobillon, 2015). On the level of the 402 counties in Germany, Haller and Heuermann (2016) show that
job search is far from being confined to single counties. In fact, since 38% of workers commute across county
borders, the relevant local labor market is effectively larger, in particular, if a county is well connected to its
6One peculiarity of the city size distribution in Germany is that according to Zipf’s law large cities are underrepresented, which is usually regarded as
resulting from a decentralized spatial structure in Germany (Giesen & Südekum, 2011).
7Throughout the paper, the term “region” refers to a municipality and its distance‐discounted neighbors.Mrt
augm in Equation (2) denotes the labor market
density within a region.
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surroundings. This argument applies even more to the municipalities used in the present context, which cover on
average only 6.5% of the area of a county. These problems can be accounted for by means of a continuous measure
which takes into account the sprawl of a labor market across municipalities. Relating the number of residents,
workers, or unemployed in municipality r at time t , denoted as Lrt , to the area of a municipality, Ar , yields a measure
for the density of a local labor market.
= =M L
A
Labor market density .rt rt
rt
r
(1)
To take into account the thickness of the labor market in the wider region, the local density Mrt can be
augmented by the distance‐discounted density of all neighboring municipalities j (Brakman, Garretsen, &
VanMarrewijk, 2009; Hansen, 1959).
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The impedance function ( )f drj is determined by its functional form, the spatial decay parameter θ and the distance drj
between two municipalities (Reggiani, Bucci, & Russo, 2011). We follow the literature (see, e.g., Andersson et al., 2018;
Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2016) and employ an exponential decay function, θ−e drj , with θ = 0.1. drj is measured by the driving
time between the centroids of two municipalities in 2005. On the basis of Equation (2), we construct our measures of job
opportunities and the degree of job competition within local labor markets. The most obvious proxy for job opportunities
would be the distance‐discounted number of vacancies per municipality. Data on vacancies are, however, notoriously
unreliable because firms are not obliged to report their vacancies to the Federal Employment Agency. As a result, the
existing data sets contain only 43% of all open positions. We, therefore, measure local job opportunities by the number of
available jobs, which we approximate by the distance‐discounted number of all full‐time employed workers within a
municipality.
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Opprt is based on the assumption that workers aim to minimize commuting distances and therefore prefer jobs
located close to their home. Within municipalities, the number of jobs is therefore discounted by the area of a
municipality. Between municipalities, the idea that the attractiveness of jobs decreases with distance is captured by
the distance decay function ( )f drj .
Regarding the local degree of job competition, Comprt , it is ex ante an open question whether displaced workers
compete with all persons in the local workforce or only with other unemployed job seekers. In light of the literature
inspired by Snower and Lindbeck (1989), it seems likely that the latter is the more relevant peer group for
unemployed workers. In addition, since most workers are employed in the region they live in, the local working age
population is closely correlated with the number of jobs (correlation: 0.91). With the use of region fixed effects, this
poses a problem for identification because the collinearity between both variables substantially reduces the
precision of the estimates. For theoretical and econometric reasons, we therefore resort to the distance‐discounted
number of unemployed workers per municipality r normalized by area as a measure for job competition.
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Defined this way,Opprt and Comprt are likely to also be correlated. In the upper panel of Figure 2, we shed light on
the relation between both variables. The figure shows that the distance‐discounted density of jobs is positively related
to the distance‐discounted density of unemployment (correlation: 0.78), which mirrors the fact that the number of jobs
and the number of unemployed both rise with the degree of agglomeration. Since in our identification approach we
control for individual and region fixed effects (see Section 3.2), the identifying variation in Opprt and Comprt stems,
however, from changes in both variables. We have therefore plotted the relation between both variables in first
differences in the upper right panel of Figure 2. With a value of −0.28, this correlation is negative, indicating that a rise
in the number of jobs is associated with a decrease in unemployment and vice versa. Important for our identification
approach, the relation between the two variables in first differences is far less pronounced compared to their relation in
levels. In Section 5, we will discuss the issue of multicollinearity in greater detail.
In the lower part of Figure 2, we shed first light on the relation between Opprt and Comprt as explanatory
variables and individual unemployment duration as outcome variable. As before, since with individual fixed
effects the identifying variation stems from changes in either variable, we have plotted the two relations in first
differences. The figure shows that in line with expectations a rise in job opportunities is associated with a
decrease in the number of days in unemployment, while the reverse applies to changes in the intensity of job
competition. A comparison of the vertical axes shows that, consistent with our later findings, the variation in
F IGURE 2 Job opportunities, job competition and days in unemployment. The upper two panels show the
relation between job opportunities and job competition in levels (left panel) and in first differences (right panel)
unconditional on any covariates. Each dot represents one municipality‐quarter observation (N = 1,661,631). The
lower two panels relate average changes in the individual number of days in unemployment to changes in job
opportunities (left panel) and job competition (right panel) in bins of two units
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individual unemployment duration is more pronounced with regard to changes in job competition as compared
to changes in job opportunities.
3.2 | Identification approach
Estimating the effect that job opportunities and job competition have on individual labor market outcomes is
complicated by the fact that firms and workers are not distributed randomly in space (Combes, Duranton, &
Gobillon, 2011). This is problematic if individual characteristics that are relevant for finding a job differ
systematically between regions. In addition, unobservable regional characteristics that are correlated with the local
density of jobs or unemployment may lead to bias in the estimates. We address these issues in three ways.
First, we construct a consistent sample of workers that contains only individuals who have become unemployed
involuntarily. This is important because voluntarily unemployed workers might differ from those who are
involuntarily unemployed in terms of their job search behavior and other unobservable characteristics and are
more likely to be located in regions with better employment prospects, that is, which are shaped by lower
unemployment density and higher job density. Addressing this issue, a large number of studies inspired by Ruhm
(1991) and Jacobson et al. (1993) have therefore resorted to incidences of mass layoffs to identify workers who
have become unemployed involuntarily (see, von Wachter (2010) for a survey).8 In this paper, we follow a similar
line of reasoning and focus on workers who were displaced as a result of plant closures. We use incidences of plant
closures rather than mass layoffs because the latter are restricted to a small and selective subset of regions. Plant
closures do, in contrast, approximate the distribution of workers across locations fairly well. In fact, 77% of workers
who are displaced as a result of plant closures live in urban regions. This is similar to the population distribution in
Germany, where 75% of individuals live in cities.
Second, we restrict the sample in terms of worker mobility and tenure. Regarding mobility, we include only
workers who have changed neither their place of residence nor their employer over a period of 4 years before the
closure of a firm (Schmieder et al., 2010). While this restriction may limit the external validity of our results, it
eliminates the possibility of selective moves between regions, which would impede a correct identification of the
effect of job opportunities and competition on unemployment. In Section 4, we discuss the extent to which our
results can be generalized by comparing the characteristics of the workers in our sample to the population of all
employed and unemployed workers in Germany.
Finally, we control for individual fixed effects. Due to the restrictions imposed with regard to moving behavior,
these fixed effects also absorb all time‐invariant regional characteristics because workers by definition do not
change municipalities. As discussed in Section 2, the use of individual fixed effects provides a novel approach in the
literature since in particular the studies by Détang‐Dessendre and Gaigné (2009) and Andersson et al. (2018) do
not control for unobserved worker heterogeneity. We compare our results to theirs in Section 5.
On the basis of the resulting sample of workers, we examine the effect of job opportunities and job competition
on individual employment prospects by means of the following regression approach. Denote the number of days
that a displaced worker i spends in unemployment per quarter q as diq, which is the dependent variable. Since we
observe workers for a period of 4 years after the incidence of involuntary displacement, q runs from =q 0 to
=q 16. In addition, assume that worker i lives in municipality r , which is characterized among other things by the
number of job opportunities, Opprq, and the intensity of job competition, Comprq. The following equation relates the
time that each worker spends in unemployment per quarter to both variables.
8This literature shows that a period of involuntary unemployment yields substantial income losses for displaced workers due to a loss of firm‐specific
knowledge (Couch & Placzek, 2010; Schmieder et al., 2010) and occupational mismatch (Holm, Østergaard, & Olesen, 2016; Nedelkoska, Neffke, &
Wiederhold, 2015). In addition, effects on health (Sullivan & von Wachter, 2009), fertility decision (Huttunen & Kellokumpu, 2016), divorce probabilities
(Eliason, 2012) and the intergenerational transmission of these effects (Oreopoulos, Page, & Stevens, 2008) have been examined. Gathmann, Helm, and
Schönberg (2018) provide evidence for sizeable regional spillovers from mass layoffs.
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Rrq is a matrix of regional covariates that controls for systematic differences between regions in terms of
gross domestic product (GDP), amenities, and commuters. ϕi denotes individual fixed effects.9 ψt represents year‐
quarter fixed effects, which capture variation in re‐employment chances over the business cycle. Since
re‐employment prospects vary with time spent in unemployment, we include fixed effects for each quarter after
the incidence of displacement, ωq. With regard to the relative importance of demand and supply side
explanations, note that ϕi, ψt and ωq effectively also control for variation in reservation wages between workers
and over the business and unemployment cycle. Note also that we standardize Oppiq and Compiq by their
respective mean and standard deviation per municipality. Doing so allows for interpreting the coefficients as
changes in days in unemployment per quarter as a result of a change in either Oppiq or Compiq by one standard
deviation. As a result, we can directly compare β1 and β2 in terms of their size. Throughout all regressions,
standard errors are clustered on the level of municipalities.
4 | DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
4.1 | Data
We draw on administrative data from the German social security records, which are provided by the Institute for
Employment Research. The Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) contain information in daily frequency for all
employed persons who are subject to statutory social security contributions, as well as on all recipients of
unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance (Antoni & Ganzer, 2014). Important in the present context,
the data also contain information on the particular plant a worker is employed at as well as on the municipality a
worker lives and works in. On the basis of these linked employer‐employee‐data, we identify in a first step all plants
that were closed between 1999 and 2009 and that have employed at least four workers at the time of closure.10
The latter restriction accounts for the risk that otherwise the resulting unemployment needs not necessarily be
involuntary but might rather be the result of a deliberate decision of one person or a small group of persons. For
the resulting set of firms, we draw on the employment biographies of all full‐time employed workers between 25
and 50 years of age who have not left a firm earlier than 6 months before its closure. In addition, we apply the
restrictions discussed in Section 3, that is, we only include workers who had changed neither their place of
residence nor their employer over a period of 4 years before the closure of a firm.11
One problem we had to address is the issue of sample attrition after displacement. Around 12% of workers
disappear from the data in the quarter after displacement and 27% drop out of the sample over the next 4 years.
The main reasons are that workers become employed part‐time, are self‐employed, or leave the labor
market altogether. To account for such temporary or permanent dropouts, we generate spells for these periods
which we label “neither full‐time employed nor unemployed.” We then convert the spell data into a balanced panel
data set by counting the days that each individual spends per quarter in each of three possible states (a) full‐time
employed; (b) registered as unemployed; (c) neither full‐time employed nor unemployed. The resulting data set
contains quarterly information on 97,743 workers who were employed in 34,946 establishments for a period of
4 years before and 4 years after the displacement.
9Note that Equation (5) does not contain individual‐level controls because all variables on individual level are time‐invariant (e.g., education, gender, and
nationality) and, hence, are absorbed by the individual fixed effects.
10We address the issue of changing firm identifiers by means of the approach proposed by Hethey‐Maier and Schmieder (2013). Fackler, Schnabel, and
Wagner (2013) and Fackler and Schnabel (2015) provide an overview of the characteristics of closing firms.
11Table A.1 shows how each of these restrictions affects the number of workers in the sample.
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On regional level, we consider all 11,194 municipalities that existed on December 31, 2014. We exclude 78
uninhabited units which consist only of woods and lakes, as well as all islands, which due to their isolation are
peculiar cases in terms of their labor markets. In 6,417 of these municipalities, we observe at least one worker
who was affected by a plant closure. The number of unemployed per municipality at the end of each month is
taken from the Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency (2017), which we aggregate to quarterly averages.
Information on the number of employed individuals per municipality is contained in the Administrative Wage and
Labor Market Flow Panel (Stüber & Seth, 2017). These data are based on the full universe of establishments in
Germany. Aggregating them to the level of municipalities allows for precisely measuring the stock of employed
workers. In addition, we are able to exactly match end‐of‐quarter values, which reduces the problem of
aggregation bias inherent to other data sources. Data on the area of a municipality needed to calculate job and
unemployment densities are provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Data on local GDP, commuter balance,
and the number of hotel beds as a proxy for local amenities12 are provided on county level by the Federal
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development, as are information on driving times
between municipalities.
4.2 | Descriptive evidence
Table 1 provides summary statistics for displaced workers, closed establishments, and municipalities. The first two
columns show the mean and the standard deviation of the main variables within each dimension. The median
displaced worker is 40 years old, male, medium‐skilled,13 of German nationality, lives in West Germany and has
worked for about 6 years (2,439 days) in a firm before its closure. The median establishment has existed for
15.9 years, was located in West Germany and has employed 18 workers of which 13 were full‐time employed. The
average municipality covers an area of 44 km2. On average, each municipality contains 558 jobs and 108
unemployed persons per square kilometer.14 The mean number of workers laid off as a result of firm closures per
municipality per quarter is 15.2. One assumption of our identification design is that these workers do not differ
between regions in terms of their characteristics since otherwise we might capture a sorting effect rather than the
causal effect of density. The remaining two columns provide the means of the main variables for workers and firms
in the upper and the lower quartile of regions with regard to population density. Generally, workers and firms turn
out to be relatively similar in regions shaped by high and low degrees of urbanization. Exceptions are the average
degree of education and the nationality of the workforce. In denser areas, displaced workers are generally better
educated and have a higher probability to be foreign‐born. This once again emphasizes the need to include
individual fixed effects in the regression approach since workers may also differ in terms of unobservable
characteristics.
To shed light on the issue of external validity, we have summarized the characteristics of all employed and all
unemployed workers in Germany in Table A.2 in the Appendix. A comparison of these values with the
characteristics of the workers in our sample suggests that the restrictions we have imposed, for example, with
regard to tenure and place of residence, have not led to a sample that is disconnected from the full population of
workers and unemployed in Germany.
12Drawing on the quarterly number of firms and of workers active in the hospitality industry (hotels and restaurants) as two alternative proxies for
amenities on municipality level leaves our results unaltered.
13Note that “skills” are defined with reference to formal schooling. Low‐skilled workers are those who have not undergone or not completed vocational
training. Workers who have successfully completed vocational training are classified as medium‐skilled while workers holding a university degree are
defined as high‐skilled.
14At first glance, these figures imply an unemployment rate of 16.2%, which stands in contrast to the average official unemployment rate of 9.5% for the
years 1999–2009. This deviation results from the facts that, first, we consider only full‐time employed workers and, second, self‐employed workers are by
definition also part of the labor force. Accounting for both groups in a back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation yields: 108 unemployed/(558 full‐time
workers + 108 unemployed + 140 part‐time workers + 360 self‐employed) = 9.0%, which is reasonably close to the official average unemployment rate.
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TABLE 1 Summary statistics
Mean SD 1st Quart. 4th Quart.
Displaced workers
N 97,743 24,475 24,435
Age when displaced 39.89 6.49 39.73 39.90
Tenure (in days) 2,439 840 2,336 2,477
Female 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.29
Foreign 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.23
Low skilled 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.17
Medium skilled 0.79 0.40 0.87 0.73
High skilled 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.10
East Germany 0.34 0.47 0.45 0.35
Closed establishments
N 34,946 8,499 8,476
Firm age (in years) 15.91 9.12 15.63 16.70
East Germany 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.28
All employed 17.70 35.51 17.86 17.03
Full‐time employed 12.94 26.31 13.59 11.97
of which are female 3.37 8.45 3.05 3.58
of which are foreign 1.09 4.66 0.66 1.59
Municipalities
N 6,417 1,602 1,604
Area (in km2) 44.08 47.31 14.76 57.57
Jobs per km2 558.38 594.16 197.44 693.19
Unemployed per km2 108.30 86.07 45.14 145.00
No. of displaced workers 15.23 136.79 1 6
Vacancies per km2 8.55 10.97 2.06 10.38
Hires per km2 39.62 43.24 13.23 48.85
Note: The table provides summary statistics for displaced workers, closed establishments and municipalities. Columns “1st
Quart.” and “4th Quart.” provide the respective averages for regions in the first and fourth quartile of population density.
F IGURE 3 Job opportunities, job competition, and duration of unemployment. The maps show the regional
distribution of job opportunities as defined in Equation (3), of job competition as defined in Equation (4) and of
the average number of days in unemployment. Map (3) is based on a representative sample of unemployed taken
from the Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies. Coloring is in quintiles with darker colors indicating
higher values [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Figure 3 visualizes the distribution of job opportunities, job competition and unemployment duration across
municipalities. Maps 1 and 2 provide evidence of the spatial correlation between job opportunities and job
competition. Both variables closely follow the pattern of urbanization with densely populated regions like the
Rhine‐Ruhr and the Rhine‐Main area as well as the regions in and around the large cities of Berlin, Hamburg, and
Stuttgart exhibiting the highest values. The distribution of unemployment duration is dominated by a sharp divide
between East and West Germany with average duration being generally higher in the East. Similar to job
opportunities and job competition, average unemployment durations in the West are closely correlated with the
degree of agglomeration.
Overall, Figure 3 yields two main insights. First, it reproduces the finding from Figure 1 that the average
duration of unemployment rises with the degree of agglomeration. Second, it suggests that job opportunities and
job competition are two sides of the same coin in the sense that “thick” labor markets not only provide a larger
number of jobs, but at the same time are also home to more unemployed workers competing for these jobs. In the
next section, we disentangle the relative importance of job opportunities and job competition for the number of
days that displaced workers spend in unemployment per quarter.
5 | RESULTS
Figure 4 shows the average number of days that workers spend in unemployment per quarter after a displacement.
Amounting to >30 days in the first quarter, this number gradually decreases and converges to a persistent level of
around 11 days after 4 years.
In Table 2, we examine the effect that local job opportunities and job competition have on the number of days in
unemployment per quarter. Columns (4–6) provide the results for the specification in Equation (5) with job
opportunities and job competition being measured locally, that is, ignoring the distance‐discounted values of
neighboring regions. When introduced separately, Opprt and Comprt are highly significant with the effect of job
competition (1.59) exceeding that of job opportunities (−0.53) by a factor of three in absolute value. In column (3),
we insert both variables simultaneously. While the effect of job competition remains unaltered, the coefficient of
job opportunities falls to −0.21 and is only marginally significant. In columns (4) to (6), we replace the local values of
Opprt and Comprt by the augmented versions defined in Equations (3) and (4). In all three columns, both coefficients
are highly significant and rise in absolute magnitude compared with the local values, emphasizing the importance of
F IGURE 4 Days in unemployment before and after displacement. The figure shows the estimated days per
quarter in unemployment 4 years before and 4 years after a displacement conditional on nationality, gender, age,
age2 skill level, regional gross domestic product (GDP), commuter balance, amenities, a dummy for East/West and
year‐quarter fixed effects [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
HALLER AND HEUERMANN | 11
job competition and opportunities in neighboring regions for local unemployment duration (Manning & Petrongolo,
2017). When we insert both variables jointly in column (6), the results show that an increase in job competition by
one standard deviation raises the number of days in unemployment by about 1.77 days per quarter while a rise in
job opportunities by one standard deviation is accompanied by a reduction of 0.42 days.
In column (7), we account for potential nonlinear effects of job competition and job opportunities by inserting
quadratic terms of both variables. Regarding job opportunities, the results suggest that unemployment duration
decreases more than proportionally with the number of jobs, which is consistent with the idea that increasing
the choice that workers have between different jobs raises the probability of a successful match. The effect of
competition is, in contrast, subject to decreasing returns (but never turns negative in our sample), suggesting that
while the density of unemployed always reduces the chances of re‐employment, adding more unemployed workers
has less of an effect if competition is already intense.
One peculiarity of our setting is that workers by the construction of the sample do not change their region of
residence before being laid off. As a result, individual fixed effects effectively also control for all time‐invariant
regional characteristics before displacement. To examine the role of worker selection between regions, we estimate
Equation (5) with municipality but without individual fixed effects. A comparison of the results in columns (8) and
(6) shows that the effect of job opportunities is underestimated in the absence of individual fixed effects while the
effect of job competition is overestimated, suggesting that individuals in cities are negatively selected in terms of
TABLE 2 Regression results
Days unemployed per quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Job competition 1.597 1.557 1.890 1.767 2.535 2.796
(0.095)*** (0.102)*** (0.116)*** (0.125)*** (0.161)*** (0.187)***
Job opportunities −0.530 −0.211 −1.121 −0.422 −0.288 0.170
(0.117)*** (0.111)* (0.173)*** (0.167)*** (0.160)* (0.240)
Job competition2 −0.444
(0.056)***
Job opportunities2 −0.160
(0.063)**
Ln(GDP) −2.060 −2.963 −1.644 −2.395 −2.293 −1.851 −1.405 −0.947
(2.471) (2.915) (2.574) (2.409) (2.838) (2.492) (2.360) (2.965)
Comm. balance 0.047 0.079 0.055 0.058 0.089 0.067 0.066 0.045
(0.038) (0.044)* (0.039) (0.037) (0.044) (0.038)* (0.037)* (0.041)
Amenities −0.015 −0.017 −0.015 −0.012 −0.015 −0.011 −0.010 −0.039
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)*
Year Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Layoff Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Municipality FE N N N N N N N Y
Definition Mrt Local Local Local Total Total Total Total Total
N 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster correction on municipality level; “Definition Mrt ” indicates whether
job opportunities and competition are measured within municipalities (“local”) or are augmented by the distance‐
discounted density of all neighboring municipalities (“total”); coefficients can be interpreted as the average change in days
per quarter in unemployment as a result of a change in job opportunities or job competition by 1 standard deviation.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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their probability of finding employment. This finding is consistent with a branch of the literature in sociology, which
discusses a larger anonymity and less social pressure as main reasons for a higher incidence of long‐term
unemployment in cities (see, e.g., Siebel, 1997).
One issue discussed in the literature pertains to the question of whether the particular economic conditions at the
time of displacement affect subsequent employment prospects over and above the negative effect of a job loss itself.
Studies in this field have shown that the level of unemployment, in particular in times of recessions, yield long‐lasting
“scarring effects” on later wages and employment chances (see, e.g., Davis & von Wachter, 2011; Oreopoulos, von
Wachter, & Heisz, 2012). In the spirit of this literature, we exploit our setting to examine how persistently the intensity of
job competition at the time of displacement affects individual unemployment over the course of 4 years after a job loss. To
do so, we estimate an alternative variant of our main specification in column (6), where we interact job competition at the
time of displacement with a dummy variable for each of the 16 quarters after plant closure. Figure 5 provides point
estimates and corresponding confidence intervals. The estimates show that the effect of job competition is most
pronounced in the quarter of displacement, raising the number of days in unemployment by more than three. This effect
decreases monotonically over time but remains significant until about 2 years after displacement.
Before continuing with a number of robustness checks and extending the analysis in several ways, we briefly
summarize the results obtained so far. These are informative in at least three major respects. First, finding the
effect of job competition to be larger in absolute value by a factor of between three and four suggests that job
competition is a more important determinant of unemployment duration than job opportunities. Since both
variables rise with the degree of agglomeration, it seems that positive effects from a larger availability of jobs in
cities are more than offset by more intense competition between job seekers. Second, in line with the descriptive
evidence discussed in Section 3.1, it is unlikely that this finding is driven by a purely mechanical relationship
between both variables since the effect of job opportunities is always smaller in absolute value, regardless of
whether both variables are included separately or jointly or whether they are measured locally or are augmented
by neighboring values. Third, the results emphasize the need to control for unobserved worker heterogeneity. In
particular, a comparison of the estimates with and without individual fixed effects suggests that workers in cities
are negatively selected in terms of their job‐finding probabilities Table 3
Tables 3 and 4 provide the results from different robustness checks and extensions of the analysis. In column
(1) of Table 3, we impose an additional restriction with regard to a worker’s place of residence. So far, we have only
F IGURE 5 Scarring effects of unemployment. The figure shows the point estimates and 95% confidence
intervals of the effect that job competition at the time of job loss has on the number of days in unemployment per
quarter over a period of four years after displacement. Control variables are those in column (6) of Table 2 [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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required that workers exhibit a constant place of residence during the 4 years before displacement. To further
reduce the potential of bias from worker sorting, we now extend this restriction to 4 years before and 4 years after
the incidence of unemployment. A comparison of the results with those in column (6) of Table 2 shows that the
effect of job competition falls slightly in size while the effect of job opportunities turns insignificant. This result
suggests that “stayers” are positively selected in the sense that mostly those displaced workers who exhibit lower
re‐employment prospects leave their home region and look for work elsewhere.
In column (2), we examine the sensitivity of our findings with regard to the artificial spells we have generated to
avoid bias from panel attrition. As described in Section 4, about 27% of individuals are neither full‐time employed
nor registered as unemployed at some point during the 4 years after displacement. In these cases, we have imputed
unemployment spells of zero days. Reassuringly, dropping these artificial spells leaves the results unaltered.
As a third robustness check, we address the concern that plant closures unfold indirect general equilibrium
effects, which might drive up local unemployment durations through other channels than increased job competition
(see, e.g., Gathmann et al. (2018) on spillover effects from mass layoffs in local labor markets). To control for such
confounding effects, we add the number of workers who are laid off as a result of plant closures within a
municipality in each quarter as an additional control variable. As shown in column (3), this has no effect on the
estimates for job competition and job opportunities.
In columns (4) and (5), we explicitly control for time variation in labor market size. So far, we have accounted
for time‐invariant differences between regions by means of region fixed effects, which in the absence of movers
are a subset of individual fixed effects. Regions may, however, grow at different rates, which might lead to
systematic differences in the duration of unemployment. We address this issue in two ways. First, we add the
quarterly number of firms as an additional control variable. Second, we insert urban*quarter fixed effects, where
TABLE 3 Regression results—robustness (1)
Days unemployed per quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Job competition 1.567 1.959 1.760 1.737 1.746 1.676 1.808
(0.148)*** (0.143)*** (0.129)*** (0.125)*** (0.127)*** (0.124)*** (0.124)***
Job opportunities 0.048 −0.628 −0.411 −0.511 −0.389 −0.384
(0.218) (0.188)*** (0.168)*** (0.174)*** (0.165)*** (0.184)**
Displaced workers 0.108
(0.239)
Number of firms 0.353
(0.066)***
Job opportunities −0.419
(=vacancies) (0.124)***
Type of robustness No moves No Art. spell Displ. contr. Control for LM size LM regions Alter. meas.
N 1,147,500 1,380,207 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631
Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster correction on municipality level; all columns contain individual,
regional, year‐quarter and layoff‐quarter fixed effects as well as regional controls; all measures of job opportunities and
competition are augmented by the distance‐discounted density of all neighboring municipalities (“total”); in column (1),
workers changing their region of residence after displacement are excluded; in column (2), all “artificial spells” are dropped;
column (3) controls for the number of workers displaced as a result of firm closures perper municipality; the number of
firms in column (4) is measured in 1,000 s; column (5) additionally contains urban*quarter fixed effects; in column (6), Oppiq
and Compiq are defined on the level of labor market regions; in column (7), the distance‐discounted density of vacancies is
used as an alternative measure for job opportunities.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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urban is a binary variable that is equal to one for the 848 urban municipalities in Germany and zero for
municipalities classified as rural (see Section 3.1). Overall, controlling for labor market size in either way leaves
our findings unaltered.
Next, we address the concern that municipalities might be inappropriately small as geographic units for our
analysis. In this case, job opportunities and job competition in neighboring regions are likely to be discounted too
heavily and, consequently, Opprt and Comprt would be measured with error. We examine this issue by calculating
the spatially discounted number of job opportunities and the intensity of job competition on the level of the 141
labor market regions proposed by Kosfeld and Werner (2012) and replacing the values on municipality level used
so far by these new measures. As shown in column (6), altering the definition of regions in this way leaves the
results unchanged.
In column (7), we insert the distance‐discounted density of vacancies as an alternative measure for job
opportunities to once again address the concern that our results might be driven by the correlation between
jobs and unemployment. The advantage of the density of vacancies as an alternative measure for job
opportunities is that it is closely aligned with the density of jobs and at the same time exhibits less of a
correlation with the density of unemployment. The major drawback of this variable is that it is measured with
substantially less precision than the number of jobs. The correlation between the density of vacancies and the
density of jobs amounts to 0.88. With a value of 0.62, the correlation between vacancies and unemployment is
smaller than the one between jobs and unemployment (0.78). However, as discussed in Section 3.1, of more
importance for our identification approach is the correlation of the variables in first differences. With a
correlation between vacancies and unemployment of only −0.06 in first differences, there is no indication of a
purely mechanical relation between the two variables. When inserting the density of vacancies as an
alternative measure, the effect of job competition (1.8) still exceeds the one of job competition (−0.42) by a
factor of four in absolute value, which further defies the notion that the findings obtained so far were driven by
the collinearity between job and unemployment density.
TABLE 4 Regression results—robustness (2)
Daysunempl. p.Q. Empl .p.Q. Unempl. duration D.Unempl.p.Q. Unempl. duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Job competition 3.654 3.891 −0.017 7.233 24.577
(0.949)*** (1.135)*** (0.002)*** (6.702) (11.252)**
Job opportunities 1.412 1.115 0.003 −0.268 2.377
(2.267) (2.644) (0.002) (4.072) (5.248)
Accessibility index −5.697 −13.998 −5.576
(0.622)*** (3.285)*** (4.588)
Type of robustness IV Alternative Dep. Vars. Accessibility index
N 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 65,328 65,328 1,661,631 65,328 65,328
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster correction on municipality level; columns (1), (2), (3) and (6) contain
individual, regional, year‐quarter and layoff‐quarter fixed effects as well as regional controls; columns (4), (5) and (8)
contain closing‐firm fixed effects; all measures of job opportunities and competition are augmented by the distance‐
discounted density of all neighboring municipalities (“total”); in column (1), the distance‐discounted density of displaced
workers and the distance‐discounted density of hires are used as instruments; in column (2), the distance‐discounted
density of vacancies is used as an additional instrument; in column (3), Empl.p.Q. is a binary variable that is equal to one if a
worker is employed for at least one day within a quarter; in columns (4), (5), (7) and (8), Unempl.Dur. measures the number
of days a worker is unemployed between a displacement and the next full‐time employment; in columns (6) to (8), a variant
of the accessibility index used in Andersson et al. (2018) is used as an alternative explanatory variable.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we apply an instrumental variable approach to address the issue of reverse causality,
that is, the notion that individual unemployment duration may itself affect the density of jobs or unemployment. The
concern here is that longer individual periods of unemployment, which are caused by unobservable worker characteristics
that vary over time and between regions (motivation, ambition, etc.), lead to higher levels of unemployment and less
positions being filled within a region. Arguably, the most plausible instruments in the present context are flow variables
which directly translate into changes in job or unemployment density but are themselves unaffected by unemployment
duration. On the basis of this idea, we draw on the distance‐discounted density of displaced workers from plant closures as
an instrument for job competition and the distance‐discounted density of hires as an instruments for job opportunities.15
Columns (1) and (2) in Table A.3 provide the results from the first stage regressions. The significance of the estimates and
the corresponding F‐statistics strongly support the relevance of both instruments. Column (1) in Table 4 contains the
results from the second stage. While the estimates are less precise, they once again support the notion that job
competition is a more important determinant of unemployment duration than job opportunities. In columns (3) and (4) of
Table A.3, we augment the first stage regression by the density of vacancies as an additional instrument. As shown in
column (2) of Table 4, overidentifying the first stage in this way leaves the estimates from the second stage unaltered.
So far, we have focused on the average effect that job opportunities and job competition have on the number of
days that dismissed workers spend in unemployment per quarter. In light of the many challenges associated with long‐
term unemployment, it is also of interest to understand the effect that job opportunities and job competition have on
the probability that a worker finds a job at all within a quarter as compared with remaining in unemployment
throughout the whole period. To examine whether job opportunities and job competition also work through the
external margin of employment, we construct a binary variable that is equal to one if a worker is employed at least 1 day
within a quarter and zero otherwise. We then estimate Equation (5) with this newly defined dependent variable. The
results, which are contained in column (3), show that a rise in job competition by 1 standard deviation reduces the
probability of finding a job by nearly two percent. There is, in contrast, no evidence for a significant effect of job
opportunities. These results suggest that while job competition also reduces the chances for workers to find
employment at all, a rise in the density job opportunities works mainly through adjustments on the internal margin. This
latter finding is consistent with the idea that a rise in the number of potential jobs allows workers to find better job
matches, which in turn leads to longer periods of employment.
Closely related to the previous point is the question whether job competition and job opportunities have an effect
on the time that workers spend in unemployment between a firm closure and the next full‐time employment.
Addressing this issue, we now treat a job loss as the unit of observation with unemployment duration until the first job
after a displacement as the dependent variable. The regressors of interest are initial job competition and initial job
opportunities at the time of displacement. Adjusting the analysis in this way reduces the number of observations from
about 1.6 million to 65,328. Note that in this setting individual fixed effects cannot be applied since workers usually
have not undergone more than one plant closure. To still address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, albeit in an
imperfect way, we instead include worker characteristics (age, age2, gender, national/foreign, skill level [low, medium,
and high], and East/West) as well as firm fixed effects. Column (4) contains the results. Although the estimates are not
significant due to the substantial loss in statistical power, they still yield a familiar picture. Again, the effect of job
competition (7.2 days) on initial unemployment duration is larger in absolute value by an order of magnitude compared
to the effect of job opportunities (0.2 days), suggesting that an increase in competition for jobs at the time of
displacement raises the bar for workers to find employment after having become involuntarily unemployed. At the same
time, there is no evidence that a rise in job opportunities has an effect on initial job search durations but, as suggested
by the results in Table 2, a larger availability of suitable jobs instead seems to promote longer‐lasting employment
relations by allowing for better job matches. Since the effects of job competition and job opportunities at the time of
15As an alternative approach, we have tested the Rosen‐Robak notion that the local level of amenities should raise labor supply and thereby intensify job
competition. The number of firms and of workers active in the hospitality industry as two alternative instruments for amenities on municipality level
turned out, however, as insignificant in the first stage.
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displacement may wear out over time, we replace both variables by their average values between a job displacement
and the take‐up of a new job. As shown in column (5), the coefficient of job competition rises in size and becomes
significant while there is still no measurable effect of job opportunities on the time that workers initially spend in
unemployment after a firm closure.
In the last three columns of Table 4, we translate the approach from Andersson et al. (2018) to our setting and
compare the results we obtain to theirs. As outlined in Section 2, Andersson et al. (2018) examine the effect that
the local accessibility of jobs has on the time that workers spend in unemployment after having involuntarily lost
their job. To do so, they regress the number of quarters a worker is unemployed after a mass layoff on a combined
measure of job accessibility, which discounts the number of available jobs by the driving time and the number of
competing job seekers. The setting we make use of in this paper deviates from the one in Andersson et al. (2018)
inasmuch as they calculate a worker‐specific measure of the jobs that are accessible within a metropolitan area,
whereas we draw on region‐specific variables which also take into account neighboring municipalities. Applying
their idea of job accessibility to our context yields the following indicator.
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In this definition, the numerator contains the number of available jobs in municipality r augmented by the
distance‐discounted jobs in all other municipalities j. The denominator corrects the number of jobs in j (with r ∈ J)
for all potential job seekers in municipality j and in the municipalities k that surround j (with k ∈ J). As in Andersson
et al. (2018), we measure the number of job seekers by the working‐age population in r , j, and k .
In a first step, we estimate our main specification from column (6) in Table 2 with this combined indicator. As shown in
column (6) of Table 4, a rise in job accessibility by one unit reduces the days in unemployment per quarter by around 5.7,
which is qualitatively in line with the findings by Andersson et al. (2018). To compare the effect of job accessibility on
unemployment also in a quantitative sense, we then replace the dependent variable by the number of days a worker
spends in unemployment between a firm closure and the first full‐time employment. When estimating this specification
without fixed effects, the results in column (7) suggest that raising job accessibility by one unit reduces the number of days
in unemployment after a job loss by 14. With an average of 171 days in unemployment after a firm closure, this is equal to
a reduction of 8.2%. Notably, this result lies in the range of 5% and 9% that Andersson et al. (2018) obtain in their main
specification. When inserting closing firm fixed effects in column (8), the coefficient becomes insignificant as a result of the
loss in statistical power. Numerically, the effect amounts to 5.6 days, which is equal to a reduction of 3.3% in the duration
of unemployment with an increase in job accessibility by one unit.
In Table 5, we differentiate the effects that job opportunities and job competition have on the number of days in
unemployment by gender, age, nationality, skill‐level, region type, and firm size. All results are based on the specification
contained in column (6) of Table 2, which we estimate for 16 different groups of workers. The findings from the table can
be summarized as follows. Job competition exerts a significantly positive effect on the number of days in unemployment
for all groups except for high‐skilled workers. Ranging between 1.3 and 2.7, the point estimates show relatively little
variation. Job opportunities, in turn, have a significantly negative effect on unemployment duration for six out of the 16
groups. Significant coefficients vary in size between− 0.4 and− 0.7. In terms of their relative magnitude, these estimates
once again support the overall finding that the effect of job competition exceeds that of job opportunities by a factor of
between three and four in absolute value, which provides the first insight from the table.
The second major finding is that negative effects from job competition are largest for workers who are least likely to
resort to self‐employment or to leave the labor market altogether. This becomes most apparent when comparing the
estimates obtained by gender and by age group. Regarding the former, the effect of job competition is larger for men
(1.9) than for women (1.3). This difference can be attributed to women being more likely to resort to part‐time
employment or to leave the workforce if they become involuntarily unemployed (Bundesagentur, 2017). Similarly, when
we split the sample by the median age of 40 years, the effect of job competition is larger for younger (1.9) than for older
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workers (1.6). Despite the upper ceiling of 50 years of age that we have imposed, this result is most likely driven by the
drop‐out of older workers to early retirement. In particular during the early years of the period of observation, which
spans the years between 1999 and 2009, legal regulations still foresaw substantial room for early retirement under
certain circumstances (Bellmann & Janik, 2010; Bonin, 2009).
The third finding relates to the importance of skill level for the effects from job competition. When
differentiating the results by skills, we find job competition to affect unemployment duration only for low‐ and
medium‐skilled workers but not for high‐skilled workers. The insignificance for high‐skilled workers might be taken
as evidence that these workers compete within their own segment of the labor market and remain unaffected by
higher overall levels of unemployment.
TABLE 5 Heterogeneity of effects
Dependent variable: Days in unemployment per quarter
Gender Age
Benchmark Male Female <40 years ≥40 years
Job competition 1.767 1.928 1.332 1.919 1.632
(0.125)*** (0.157)*** (0.248)*** (0.166)*** (0.160)***
Job opportunities −0.422 −0.609 0.057 −0.254 −0.594
(0.167)** (0.193)*** (0.250) (0.188) (0.228)***
N 1,661,631 1,214,973 446,658 762,212 899,419
Nationality Skill level
German Foreign Low Medium High
Job competition 1.731 1.619 1.595 1.858 0.295
(0.119)*** (0.428)*** (0.381)*** (0.136)*** (0.388)
Job opportunities −0.479 −0.042 −0.502 −0.459 0.329
(0.158)*** (0.467) (0.613) (0.160)*** (0.455)
N 1,406,682 254,949 201,178 1,335,911 124,542
Region type East/West
Urban Rural West East
Job competition 1.640 2.101 1.606 2.715
(0.146)** (0.246)*** (0.169)*** (0.476)***
Job opportunities −0.071 −0.540 0.066 −0.475
(0.216) (0.203)*** (0.174) (0.398)
N 1,276,751 384,880 1,104,541 557,090
Firm size
<10 Emp. 10–49 Emp. >49 Emp.
Job competition 1.641 1.767 2.008
(0.234)*** (0.187)*** (0.418)***
Job opportunities −0.129 −0.715 −0.082
(0.184) (0.247)*** (0.413)
N 633,862 739,585 288,184
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster correction on municipality level; all regressions are based on the
specification contained in column (6) of Table 2 and contain individual, regional, year‐quarter and layoff‐quarter fixed
effects as well as regional controls; coefficients can be interpreted as the average change in days perper quarter in
unemployment as a result of a change in job opportunities or job competition by one standard deviation.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Fourth, when we categorize municipalities into rural and urban types according to the classification provided by
the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development, negative effects from
competition turn out to be about 20% smaller for workers residing in cities.16 This finding is in line with the notion
that metropolitan areas provide better access to job referral networks (Jahn & Neugart, 2017) and offer a broader
diversity of industries (Neffke et al., 2018), which are both likely to alleviate the negative effects from job
competition. The effect of job opportunities is, in turn, significant only in rural regions, reflecting the relative
scarcity of suitable jobs in the countryside. Differentiating the results between East and West Germany yields
almost the same picture, which is likely due to the rural nature of most regions in East Germany.
6 | CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper started off with the observation that both unemployment rates and unemployment durations are higher
in urban than in rural areas in Germany, which stands in stark contrast to the argument posited by urban economic
theory that workers benefit from sharing the risk of unemployment in larger labor markets. One explanation for
this seeming contradiction is that a higher number of job opportunities in cities might be overcompensated by more
intense competition between workers for these jobs. To examine this idea, we have disentangled the effects that
the local number of job opportunities and the degree of job competition have on the number of days that workers
spend in unemployment after having become involuntarily unemployed.
In a nutshell, our results strongly support the notion that the intensity of job competition is a more relevant
determinant of individual unemployment duration than the regional density of jobs. When controlling for individual
and regional heterogeneity and the sorting of workers across locations, we find that the effect of job competition
on the number of days workers spend in unemployment exceeds that of job opportunities by a factor of between
three and four in absolute value. Given that the density of both jobs and unemployment rises with the degree of
agglomeration, these findings put the notion of risk‐sharing in urban labor markets into perspective by emphasizing
the detrimental effect that job competition in cities has on the re‐employment prospects of workers. In addition,
this combination of result provides an explanation for empirical regularity that the duration of unemployment is
higher in urban than in rural areas in Germany.
With regard to the design of labor market policies, these findings emphasize the pivotal role of labor
supply side policies when considering additional efforts to fight higher unemployment rates in cities.
Reducing competitive pressure on job seekers, for example, through improved job placement, training
measures, and counseling services is likely to also unfold positive external effects on other job seekers. In
terms of future research, it would therefore be desirable to better understand the local segregation of labor
markets by skill level and occupation so as to be able to more effectively target active labor market policies
to different groups of unemployed workers. The contribution by Neffke et al. (2018), which complements our
findings in this direction, provides a valuable starting point for further research.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A.1 Summary of sample restrictions
All Leave <6m Tenure >4 y Aged 25–50 Countyconst Municconst
1999 131,557 89,701 18,740 13,061 10,864 10,604
2000 184,104 129,352 31,249 22,185 15,563 14,908
2001 204,003 144,544 35,499 24,902 14,640 13,397
2002 195,753 139,985 35,988 25,281 13,422 11,767
2003 156,324 117,698 33,275 23,086 11,963 10,081
2004 143,285 103,510 27,820 19,215 9,789 8,265
2005 130,165 96,072 25,737 17,421 8,785 7,378
2006 92,388 67,430 16,745 11,520 5,933 4,984
2007 95,609 68,728 16,561 11,051 5,724 4,753
2008 127,353 87,174 18,570 12,142 6,193 5,130
2009 128,049 97,144 23,179 14,872 7,701 6,476
Total 1,588,596 1,141,338 283,363 194,736 110,577 97,743
TABLE A.2 Employed and unemployed workers in Germany
Employed Unemployed
Mean SD Mean SD
N 19,274,600 2,251,352
Age 40.17 10.70 41.23 13.06
Tenure (in days) 2,732.43 2,663.02 1,884.27 2,088.97
Female 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49
Foreign 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29
Low skilled 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29
Medium skilled 0.77 0.42 0.80 0.40
High skilled 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30
East Germany 0.21 0.41 0.30 0.45
Calculations based on the Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB) provided by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB).
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TABLE A.3 IV‐regressions, first stages
Job opportunities Job competition Job opportunities Job competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Density of displaced workers −0.221 0.383 −0.223 0.391
(0.028)*** (0.062)*** (0.029)*** (0.058)***
Density of hires −0.052 0.217 −0.057 0.209
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)***
Density of vacancies 0.042 −0.085
(0.012)*** (0.020)***
Year‐Quarter FE Y Y Y Y
Layoff‐Quarter FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Definition Mrt total Total Total Total
F‐statistic 48.1 533.1 40.8 362.9
N 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631 1,661,631
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster correction on municipality level; the table provides the results from
two sets of first stage regressions; the respective second stages are contained in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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